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Abstract—This paper studies the secrecy rate maximization
problem of a secure wireless communication system, in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The security of the com-
munication link is enhanced through cooperative jamming, with
the help of multiple jammers. First, a feasibility condition is
derived to achieve a positive secrecy rate at the destination.
Then, we solve the original secrecy rate maximization problem,
which is not convex in terms of power allocation at the jammers.
To circumvent this non-convexity, the achievable secrecy rate
is approximated for a given power allocation at the jammers
and the approximated problem is formulated into a geometric
programming one. Based on this approximation, an iterative
algorithm has been developed to obtain the optimal power
allocation at the jammers. Next, we provide a bisection approach,
based on one-dimensional search, to validate the optimality of the
proposed algorithm. In addition, by assuming Rayleigh fading,
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the proposed cooperative
jamming scheme is analyzed. More specifically, a single-integral
form expression for SOP is derived for the most general case
as well as a closed-form expression for the special case of two
cooperative jammers and one eavesdropper. Simulation results
have been provided to validate the convergence and the optimality
of the proposed algorithm as well as the theoretical derivations
of the presented SOP analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical (PHY) layer security has recently received con-
siderable attention as a significant candidate to enhance the
quality of secure communication in emerging and future
wireless networks, including the fifth generation (5G) standard
[1]. In this new paradigm, the propagation characteristics of
wireless channels are exploited against passive eavesdroppers
and active attacks through PHY layer secret key generation
and authentication schemes, while complementing the conven-
tional cryptographic methods [2]. The fundamental concept
of information-theoretic security was first investigated in [3]
and [4], where it was shown that secure communication is
feasible when the channel quality of legitimate parties is better
than that of the eavesdropper. However, in practice, this is not
always possible and so, the performance of PHY layer security
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is limited.
In order to circumvent the performance limitations in-
troduced by the unfavourable wireless channel conditions,
cooperative jamming has been proposed as an enabler of
secrecy communication [?], [5]–[14]. Under this approach,
jamming signals are transmitted to improve the secrecy rate
performance, by introducing interference at the eavesdrop-
pers. In [15], different secrecy rate optimization problems
have been solved for relay network based on cooperative
jamming, where the relays transmit noise to confound the
eavesdroppers. However, these optimization problems have
been considered with a total relay power constraint. For
the same network, a cooperative jamming scheme has been
proposed in [16] with no interference leakage to the legitimate
user. Furthermore, in [17], opportunistic cooperative jamming
and relay chatting schemes have been developed, without the
knowledge of eavesdropper channel state information (CSI),
and the performance of these schemes have been evaluated
through the secrecy outage probability (SOP) criterion. On the
other hand, in [18], an uncoordinated cooperative jamming
scheme with multi-antenna relays has been investigated by
nulling the interference leakage at the destination and the
corresponding SOP has been quantified with eavesdroppers’
statistical CSI. In [19], optimal cooperative jamming scheme
has been proposed with multiple relays in the presence of a
single eavesdropper, where the optimal relay coefficients have
been obtained through an one-dimensional search scheme.
The SOP of a multi-user wireless communication system,
that consists of multiple users who transmit to a base station,
while multiple eavesdroppers attempt to tap their transmis-
sions, has been analyzed over Rayleigh fading channels in
[20]. In [21], a closed-form expression of SOP was derived for
Rayleigh fading channels in a secrecy network with a multi-
antenna source and a single-antenna destination in the presence
of a single-antenna eavesdropper. Finally, in [22], the SOP
performance of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel, employing transmit antenna selection and
receive generalized selection combining, has been analyzed
over Nakagami-m fading channels.
In this paper, we consider a PHY layer security network
with single-antenna nodes, where a source-destination pair
establishes secured communication, with the help of multiple
jammers in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. For this
network setup, we first present a feasibility condition to
achieve a positive secrecy rate at the destination. Then, the
secrecy rate maximization problem is solved to determine the
optimal power allocation at the jammers, which is a non-
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Fig. 1: The considered secrecy network with one source, one
destination and multiple jammers, in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers.
convex problem in nature. In order to overcome the non-
convexity of the secrecy rate function, we approximate it
for a given power allocation at the jammers and formulate
the problem into a geometric programming one. Based on
this approximation, an iterative algorithm is developed, by
updating a better power allocation at each iteration. To validate
the optimality of the presented results, we use one-dimensional
search based on bisection to determine the optimal power
allocation of the original secrecy rate maximization problem.
Both the proposed and the one-dimensional search algorithms
yield identical results, which confirms the optimality of the
proposed algorithm. Moreover, the SOP of the proposed
scheme is analyzed over Rayleigh fading channels. A single-
integral form expression for the SOP is presented for the
most general scenario, whereas a closed-form expression is
derived for the special case of two cooperative jammers and
one eavesdropper. Finally, numerical and simulation results
have been provided to validate the theoretical derivations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model and the secrecy rate maximization problem
formulation are presented in Section II. A feasibility condition
to achieve positive secrecy rate is provided in Section III,
whereas Section IV presents an iterative approach for an
approximated secrecy rate maximization problem. In Sec-
tion V, the optimality of the proposed scheme is validated
through one-dimensional search. The SOP analysis is derived
in Section VI for Rayleigh fading channels, whereas Section
VII provides numerical and simulation results to validate
the performance of the proposed algorithm and the derived
theoretical SOP expressions. Finally, Section VIII concludes
this paper.
Notations:We use lower-case boldface letters for vectors. ()T
and j  j denote the transpose of a vector and absolute value
of a complex number, respectively. [x]+ represents maxfx; 0g
whereas Efg, Pr[] and r() denote expectation, probability
and gradient operator, respectively. The cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF)
of a random variable (RV) X are represented as FX() and
fX(), respectively. Ei() is the exponential integral [23, eq.
(8.211/1)].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secrecy network, as shown in Fig. 1, with
one source, S, which communicates with a destination, D and
N cooperative jammers, J1; J2; : : : ; JN , in the presence of
M eavesdroppers, E1; E2; : : : ; EM . The source S wishes to
transmit secured information to destination D. It is assumed
that all network nodes are equipped with a single antenna.
The channel coefficient between S and D is denoted by
hD, whereas hEm represents the channel gain between S
and the mth eavesdropper Em, with m = 1; 2; : : : ;M . In
addition, the channel coefficient between the nth cooperative
jammer Jn and D as well as Em are denoted by g
(n)
D and
g
(n)
Em, respectively. The CSI between all nodes are assumed
to be perfectly available at S, D and Em 8m. The source S
transmits signals to destination D whereas all jammers send
interference signals to confound the eavesdroppers.
The received signals at D and Em can be mathematically
expressed respectively, as
yD =
p
PshDxs +
NX
i=1
p
Pig
(i)
D x
(i)
c + D (1)
yEm =
p
PshEmxs +
NX
i=1
p
Pig
(i)
Emx
(i)
c + Em (2)
where xs (Efjxsj2g = 1) and x(i)c (Efjx(i)c j2g = 1) denote the
transmitted signal from S to D and the jamming signal from
the ith jammer Ji, respectively. In addition, D (EfjDj2g =
2D) and Em (EfjEmj2g = 2Em) represent the noise at
node D and mth eavesdropper Em, respectively. The power
allocation at Ji and S are denoted by Pi and Ps, respectively.
Assuming white Gaussian noise, the achievable secrecy rate
at D is defined as
Rs = [log2 (1 + D)  log2 (1 + Emax)]+ (3)
where Emax = max fE1; E2; : : : ; EMg and D, Em are
the signal-to-interference plus noise ratios (SINR) at D and
Em, respectively, given by
D =
PsjhDj2PN
i=1 Pijg(i)D j2 + 2D
(4)
Em =
PsjhEmj2PN
i=1 Pijg(i)Emj2 + 2Em
: (5)
For the secrecy network studied in this paper, we consider
secrecy rate maximization with transmit power constraint. In
particular, we intend to maximize the achievable secrecy rate
at the destination node D, with the available transmit power
at the source node and all N available jammers. The secrecy
rate maximization problem can be therefore formulated as
P1 : max
p0
Rs
s.t. Pi  Pi; 8i (6)
where Pi is the maximum available transmit power at Ji and
p = [P1 P2    PN ]T .
III. FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS
3FOR POSITIVE SECRECY RATE
The optimization problem P1, formulated in (6), is valid
or worth to solve only when it is possible to achieve a
positive secrecy rate for a given set of channels and transmit
powers at D and Jis. Through verifying these feasibility
conditions, the source can make a decision whether to solve
the secrecy rate maximization to obtain a positive secrecy rate
at the destination. Hence, we first investigate the feasibility
conditions. From (3), the following conditions need to be
satisfied for m = 1; 2; : : : ;M :
PsjhDj2PN
i=1 Pijg(i)D j2 + 2D
>
PsjhEmj2PN
i=1 Pijg(i)Emj2 + 2Em
(7)
By arranging the terms in (7), the following equality needs to
hold 8m:
jhDj2
 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)Emj2+2Em
!
>jhEmj2
 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)D j2+2D
!
which can be expressed as
pT
 jhDj2gEm jhEmj2gD> jhEmj22D jhDj22Em (8)
where
gEm =
h
jg(1)Emj2 jg(2)Emj2    jg(N)Em j2
iT
gD =
h
jg(1)D j2 jg(2)D j2    jg(N)D j2
iT
(9)
The feasibility conditions given by (8) can be formulated into
the following linear programming problem [24]:
min
p0
1Tp
s.t. pT
 jhDj2gEm jhEmj2gD>jhEmj22D jhDj22Em;
8m: (10)
The above convex problem can be easily solved using existing
convex optimization software [24], [25]. A positive secrecy
rate can be only achieved at the destination node, if the
problem in (10) is feasible. In the following section, we solve
the secrecy rate maximization problem, with the assumption
that a positive secrecy rate is achievable.
IV. AN ITERATIVE APPROACH FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE
SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
The secrecy rate maximization problem P1 given by (6)
is non-convex due to the non-convex secrecy rate function
and therefore it is challenging to obtain the optimal solution.
In this section, we develop an iterative algorithm for the
power allocation p at the jammer nodes, that is based on an
approximation to the original problem P1. By reformulating
(6) and introducing a new slack variable  , the original secrecy
maximization problem P1 can be written as
P2 : min
p0;0

s.t.  Em(p) ,
Em(p)
	Em(p)
 ; 8m
Pi  Pi; 8i: (11)
where
	Em(p),
 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)D j2 + PsjhDj2 + 2D
!

 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)Emj2 + 2Em
!
,
X
k
 
(k)
Em (12)
and
Em(p) ,
 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)Emj2 + 2Em + PsjhEmj2
!

 
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)D j2+2D
!
: (13)
In (12),  (k)Em represents the individual term in the summa-
tion, obtained by expanding function 	Em(p). The constraint
in (11) is a quadratic fractional non-convex function. However,
the problem in (11) can be converted into a series of geometric
programming problems by exploiting the single condensation
method [26]. A fractional constraint with a posynomial nu-
merator and a monomial denominator is convex. The idea of
approximating the denominator posynomial with a monomial
was presented in [24] in order to convert the aforementioned
constraint to a convex one. We hereinafter adopt this idea and
we approximate 	Em(p) (i.e., denominator of the constraint
in (11)) to the best monomial, for a given set of p. The
following lemma is required:
Lemma 1: For a posynomial g(x), the following inequality
holds:
g(x) =
KX
k=1
wk(x)  g^(x^) =
KY
k=1

wk(x)
ak
ak
(14)
where ak > 0 and
PK
k=1 ak = 1. Notation g^(x^) represents
the best approximation of g(x^) at x^ with ak = wk(x^)=g(x^),
and the inequality in (14) holds with an equality at this point.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Based on Lemma 1, the denominator polynomial function
	Em(p) in (11), can be approximated as 	^Em(p)
	Em(p)  	^Em(p) ,
KY
k=1
"
 
(k)
Em

(m)
k
#(m)k
(15)
where

(m)
k ,
 
(k)
Em
	^Em(p)
8k: (16)
Using the approximation given by (15), the problem P2 can
be reformulated for a given set of power allocation p as
P3 : min
p0;0

s.t.  ^Em(p) ,
Em(p)
	^Em(p)
 ; 8m;
Pi  Pi; 8i: (17)
The above optimization problem P3, which is an approx-
imation of the original P1, can be now formulated into a
standard geometric programming one. The iterative algorithm
A is developed for P3, where the power allocation p is updated
4Algorithm A: Secrecy Rate Maximization
Step 1: Initialization of power allocation vector p
Step 2: Repeat
1) Calculate 	Em(p); 8m using (12).
2) Calculate (m)k ; 8k; m using (16).
3) Determine 	^Em(p); 8m by using (15).
4) Solve the standard geometric programming problem in
(17).
Step 3: Until required accuracy is achieved or the maximum
number of iterations is reached.
at each iteration.
The solution of the proposed Algorithm A satisfies the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. This can be validated
by proving the following three conditions [27]:
1)  Em(p)   ^Em(p); 8 m;p, where  Em(p) =
Em(p)
	Em(p)
.
2)  Em(~p) =  ^Em(~p); 8 m; where ~p denotes the power
allocation obtained from the previous iteration of Algo-
rithm A.
3) r Em(~p) = r ^Em(~p);8 m.
The first condition holds due to the fact that 	Em(p) 
	^Em(p), which is true from Lemma 1. In addition, the second
condition is satisfied from the equality condition in Lemma
1. The third condition can be validated through proving
r	^Em(~p) = r	Em(~p) for all m:
r	^Em(~p)=
"
@	^Em(~p)
@P1

~P1
@	^Em(~p)
@P2

~P2
  @	^Em(~p)
@PN

~PN
#
;
8m; (18)
@	^Em
@P1

P1= ~P1
=
Y
k
"
 
(k)
Em

(m)
k
#(m)k " P
k 
(k)
Em
P1	^Em(~p)
#
=
h
	^Em(~p)
iP
k 
(m)
k
P
k 
(k)
Em
P1	^Em(~p)
=
P
k 
(k)
Em
P1
=
@	Em
@P1

P1= ~P1
(19)
where (k)Em are the differentiated  
(k)
Em’s with respect to
P1. Similarly, the rest of the partial derivatives in (18) can
be derived and it can be easily proved to be equal to the
partial derivatives of 	Em(~p), with respect to the correspond-
ing power allocation. Hence, the power allocation obtained
through Algorithm A satisfies the KKT conditions of the
original optimization problem P1. However, it is difficult to
analytically prove global optimality. In addition, the geometric
programming in Algorithm A can be solved with polynomial
time complexity. In order to validate the convergence of the
proposed algorithm, simulation results will be provided in
Section VII for different sets of wireless channels.
A. Convergence Analysis
The approximated secrecy rate maximization problem P3
given by (17) is convex, and the optimal power allocation
p can be obtained by solving (17) for a given set of power
allocation ~p. At each iteration, the power allocation ~p is
updated from the optimal solution p determined through the
previous iteration. Hence, ~p is always a feasible solution of the
next iteration, and the optimal power allocation p obtained
for a given ~p will achieve a secrecy rate, which is greater
than or equal to that of the previous iteration. This reveals
that the achieved secrecy rate will monotonically increase at
each iteration, which can be also observed from the simulation
results, presented in Fig. 2. Since, the achievable secrecy rate
is upper bounded for a given transmit power at the jammers,
this algorithm will converge to a solution. Fortunately, the
proposed Algorithm A converges to the optimal solution,
which is validated through an one-dimensional search, based
on bisection and provided in the following section.
V. OPTIMALITY VALIDATION OF THE SECRECY RATE
MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an one-dimensional search ap-
proach to validate the optimality of the proposed algorithm A.
The concept behind this approach is to fix the received total
interference power at the destination node and find the optimal
power allocation at the jammers [19], [28]. The secrecy rate
maximization problem P1 can be formulated into the following
max-min one:
P4 : R = max
p
min
ti
(t1; t2; : : : ; tM )
s.t. log2
0B@ 1+ PsjhDj
2PN
i=1 Pijg(i)D j2+2D
1+ PsjhEmj
2PN
i=1 Pijg(1)Emj2+2Em
1CA  tm; 8m
Pi  Pi; 8i (20)
where R is the optimal achieved secrecy rate. By fixing
the total received interference (i.e.,
PN
i=1 Pijg(i)D j2) at the
destination to a particular value t0, the following subproblem
can be formulated as:
P5 : q = max
p;t
t
s.t.
NX
i=1
Pijg(i)D j2 = t0;
REm(t0)=
1 + PsjhDj
2
t0+2D
1 + PsjhEmj
2
fm(t0)+2Em
 t;8m
Pi  Pi;8i (21)
where fm(t0) =
PN
i=1 Pijg(1)Emj2. Next we show that the
problem in (21) is quasi-convex in terms of t0, and therefore,
the optimal t0 can be obtained through one-dimensional
search.
Lemma 2: REm(t0) is a quasi-concave function in terms of
t0.
Proof: This can be proved by finding the second deriva-
tive of REm(t0) with respect to t0 and easily provided that it
5Algorithm B: One-Dimensional Search Based on Bisection
Step 1: Initialize t(min)0 ; t
(max)
0 and 
Step 2: Solve the problem in P5 given by (21) with t0 =
t
(min)
0 +3t
(max)
0
4 .
Step 3: Set t = t.
Step 4: Repeat
1) t0 =
t
(min)
0 +t
(max)
0
2 .
2) Solve the problem P5 given by (21) and obtain the value
of t
3) If t > t
4) t(min)0 =
t
(min)
0 +t
(max)
0
2
5) else
6) t(max)0 =
t
(min)
0 +t
(max)
0
2
7) end
Step 5: Repeat until t(max)0   t(min)0  .
is negative for any t0 > 0 [28].
In addition, the point-wise infimum of a set of quasi-concave
functions is quasi-concave [24]. Therefore, the problem P5
given by (21) is quasi-convex and the optimal power allocation
at the jammers can be obtained through Algorithm B.
VI. SOP ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we analyze the SOP performance of the
proposed cooperative jamming scheme over Rayleigh fading
channels. In particular, for the system model presented in
Sec: II, we assume that hD as well as g
(n)
D 8 n = 1; 2; : : : ; N
and Ei 8 i = 1; 2; : : : ;M are standard circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian RVs.
By using the SOP definition of [29], the SOP of the
proposed cooperative jamming scheme can be obtained as
Pout =Pr

log2
D + 1
Emax + 1
< R
D > Emax
 Pr [D > Emax ] + Pr [D  Emax ]
(22)
where R denotes the rate in bits per second (bps) per Hertz.
With the utilization of the auxiliary positive real parameter
 , 2R and the negative real parameter  , 2 R   1, (22)
can be rewritten, as shown in Appendix B, as
Pout = 1  Pr

Emax <
D

+ 

= 1  
Z 1
0
FEmax (x)fD(x  )dx:
(23)
In order to solve the integral in (23), we first derive
a closed-form expression for the PDF of D as follows.
Since z , PsjhDj2 is an exponentially distributed RV and
y ,
PN
n=1 Pnjg(n)Ei j2 is a generalized chi-squared one, by
obtaining the CDF of z and the PDF of y by easily integrating
[30, eq. (2.7)] and from [31, eq. (19)] for distinct Pn’s, it can
be shown that the CDF of D is given by
FD(x) =
Z 1
2D
Fz(xw)fy
 
w   2D

dw
= 1 
NX
n=1
An exp

2D
Pn
Z 1
2D
exp

 

x
Ps
+
1
Pn

w

dw
(a)
= 1  Ps exp

 
2
Dx
Ps
 NX
n=1
AnPn
Pnx+ Ps
(24)
where (a) follows after using [23, eq. (3.381/3)] and the
definition
An ,
24Pn NY
j=1;j 6=n

1  Pj
Pn
35 1 : (25)
By differentiating (24), the PDF of D is easily derived as
fD(x) = exp

 
2
Dx
Ps


NX
n=1
AnPn
"
2D
Pnx+ Ps
+
PsPn
(Pnx+ Ps)
2
#
:
(26)
A closed-form expression for the CDF of Emax can be easily
obtained using the marginal CDFs of Ei 8 i and the fact that
these RVs are independent. In particular, the latter CDFs are
derived in closed form similar to the CDF of D and each is
given by (24) after substituting 2D with 
2
Ei
. Hence, the CDF
of Emax can be expressed as
FEmax (x) =
MY
i=1
"
1  Ps exp

 
2
Ei
x
Ps
 NX
n=1
AnPn
Pnx+ Ps
#
:
(27)
By substituting (26) and (27) into (23), an analytical ex-
pression in the form of a single integral for the SOP of the
proposed PHY-layer security scheme can be obtained as
Pout = 1   exp

2D
Ps

Y (28)
where integral Y is given by
Y =
Z 1
0
(
MY
i=1
"
1  Ps exp

 
2
Ei
x
Ps
 NX
n=1
An
x+ n
#)
 exp ( x)
NX
n=1
An

"
2D
x  n +
Ps
 (x  n)2
#
dx
(29)
with  , P 1s 2D as well as, for n = 1; 2; : : : ; N , n ,
Ps= (Pn)    and n , Ps=Pn. By using the closed-
form solution for Y included in Appendix C, a closed-form
expression for the SOP of the proposed scheme for arbitrary
6positive integer values of N and M is given by
Pout = 1   exp ()
(
NX
n=1
An


2DI1;0 (; n; 0)
+
Ps

I2;0 (; n; 0)

+
X
figMi=1
P is
X
k1+k2++kN=i
i!QN
n=1 kn!

 
NY
t=1
Aktt
!
NX
n=1
An

h
2DI1;fkngNn=1
 
 i; n; fngNn=1

+
Ps

I2;fkngNn=1
 
 i; n; fngNn=1

(30)
where symbol
P
figMi=1 is used for short-
hand representation of the multiple summationPM
i=1
PM i+1
1=1
PM i+2
2=1+1
  PMi=i 1+1 and the sumP
k1+k2++kN=i is taken over all combinations of
nonnegative integer indices k1 through kN such that the sum
of all kn is i. Moreover, I`;fkngNn=1

1; 2; f3;ngNn=1

is
given by (C.8) for ` = 1; 2 as well as for kn being positive
integer and 1, 2, 3;n 2 R+ 8 n = 1; 2; : : : ; N . As an
example, for the special case of N = 2 and M = 1, the latter
SOP expression simplifies to
Pout = 1   exp ()

(
2X
n=1
An


2DI1;0 (; n; 0) +
Ps

I2;0 (; n; 0)

 
2X
n=1
PsA2n


2DI1;1 ( ; n; n) +
Ps

I2;1 ( ; n; n)

  PsA1A2
2
D

[I1;1 ( ; 1; 2) + I1;1 ( ; 2; 1)]
  P
2
sA1A2
2
[I2;1 ( ; 1; 2) + I2;1 ( ; 2; 1)]

(31)
where  ,  + P 1s 2E1 ,
I1;0 (; n; 0) =   exp (n) Ei ( n) ; (32a)
I2;0 (; n; 0) = 
 1
n +  exp (n) Ei ( n) ; (32b)
and
I1;1 ( ; n; n) =
I1;0 ( ; n)  I1;0 ( ; n)
n   n ; (32c)
I2;1 ( ; n; n) =
I1;0 ( ; n)  I1;0 ( ; n)
(n   n)2
  I2;0 ( ; n)
n   n :
(32d)
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In order to validate the performance of the proposed al-
gorithms, we consider the secrecy network shown in Fig. 1,
with a source-destination pair, three (N = 3) cooperative
jammers and two (M = 2) eavesdroppers. In the following
simulations, all the channel coefficients involved are gener-
ated using zero-mean circularly symmetric independent and
identically distributed complex Gaussian RVs. In addition, the
noise variances at the destination and the eavesdroppers are
assumed to be 0.1.
To assess the convergence of the proposed secrecy rate max-
imization algorithm, the available maximum transmit powers
at the source and relays have been set to, Ps = 2, P1 = 1,
P2 = 1 and P3 = 3. Fig. 2 depicts the convergence of the
achievable secrecy rates for a set of different feasible channels.
As it is evident from this figure, the proposed algorithm
converges, while the achievable secrecy rates increase with
the iteration number. In addition, it has been observed that
the proposed Algorithm A converges to the same secrecy rate,
with different initialization of transmit powers at the jammers.
However, we could not provide analytical results to prove this
convergence. As we discussed in the convergence analysis of
the algorithm, it can be observed that the achievable secrecy
rate monotonically increases with the iteration number.
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm with the existing scheme in [19] and the best jammer
selection scheme. The cooperative jamming scheme in [19]
has been developed using both convex optimization approach
and one dimensional search scheme in the presence of a
single eavesdropper whereas the best jammer is selected from
available cooperative jammers in the best jammer selection
scheme. In order to evaluate this comparison, the same secrecy
network in the previous simulation is considered with a single
eavesdropper and with the same noise variance 0.1 at all the
nodes. Fig. 3 depicts the achieved secrecy rates for different
available transmit power at the source and the cooperative
jammers for different sets of channels, where it is assumed
that the maximum available transmit power at the source and
the cooperative jammers are the same. As seen in Fig. 3, both
the proposed algorithm and the scheme in [19] achieve the
same secrecy rates for different sets of channels with the same
transmit power constraints and better secrecy rates than the
best jammer selection scheme. This confirms that the proposed
algorithm shows the same performance as the optimal scheme
in [19] and outperforms the best jammer selection scheme.
Next, we evaluate the optimality of the power allocation
obtained through the proposed Algorithm A. In order to do
this, we simulate Algorithm B for the same set of channels
considered for Algorithm A. Table I presents the power
allocation and the secrecy rates obtained through Algorithm B
that is based on one-dimensional search and on the Algorithm
A. As we can conclude from this table, the power allocation
and achieved secrecy rates are identical for different sets
of channels in both algorithms. Note that there are small
differences in the power allocation and achieved secrecy rates,
due to the accuracy or precision of software used. However,
these results provided in Table I confirm the optimality of the
proposed secrecy rate maximization Algorithm A.
By numerically evaluating (31), Fig. 4 depicts SOP per-
formance as a function of rate R in bps per Hertz for
N = 2 cooperative jammers, M = 1 eavesdropper and
various power levels. It is shown in this figure that computer
simulation results for SOP match perfectly with the equivalent
numerical ones, for all considered parameters. As expected,
SOP degrades with increasing values for R. In addition, as
the transmit power of the source S increases and the transmit
7Algorithm B Algorithm A
Channels P1 P2 P3
Achieved
Secrecy Rate P1 P2 P3
Achieved
Secrecy Rate
1 1.00 0 0.50 1.62 1.00 0 0.50 1.62
2 1.00 0 0.17 2.98 1.00 0 0.16 2.98
3 0.47 0 0.35 1.68 0.46 0 0.34 1.68
4 1.00 0.43 0 2.72 1.00 0.42 0 2.73
5 0 0.28 0.31 1.09 0 0.28 0.31 1.09
TABLE I: The optimal power allocation at the jammers based on Algorithm A and Algorithm B, for different sets of
wireless channels.
powers at the two cooperative jammers J1 and J2 decrease,
SOP improves. The best SOP performance in this figure for
all considered R values is achieved with Ps = 15 dB, P1 = 0
dB and P2 = 2 dB, and the lower value for SOP is 0:5.
The SOP performance as a function of source S’s transmit
power Ps is illustrated in Fig. 5. The following transmission
scenarios have been considered: i) Scenario 1: R = 1,
P1 =  4 dB and Pi = P1 + (i   1) dB with i = 2; 3
and 4; and ii) Scenario 2: R = 0:01, P1 = 1 dB and
Pi = P1 + (i   1) dB with i = 2; 3 and 4. For the
SOP results, the single-integral expression given by (28) after
substituting (29) and the closed-form expression given by (30)
for arbitrary values of N and M as well as the closed-form
expression given by (31) for M = 2 and N = 1 have been
numerically evaluated. As clearly shown, computer simulation
results for SOP coincide with the numerical ones, for all
considered parameters. Furthermore, it is evident that, for the
same values of N and M , the SOP performance of Scenario
2 is always better than that of Scenario 1. In both scenarios,
the minimum SOP is accomplished with N = M = 1 and
the maximum with N = M = 4. Also, as expected, SOP
improves with increasing values of Ps for all considered cases.
In addition, it is shown in this figure that, as M increases
while N is kept constant, SOP degrades significantly. This
performance degradation can be confronted for some range of
Ps values by increasing N . However, increasing N introduces
a SOP performance penalty, that needs to be taken under
consideration when designing a cooperating jamming scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the power allocation problem
of secrecy rate maximization with cooperative jammers, in
the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. For this problem, a
feasibility condition was first derived for power allocation in
order to achieve positive secrecy rate. Then, the original non-
convex secrecy rate maximization problem was solved to ob-
tain the optimal power allocation at the jammers. The proposed
optimal iterative approach was developed by approximating
the secrecy rate function and formulating the corresponding
problem into a geometric programming problem for a given
set of power allocation at the jammers. In order to validate
the optimality of the developed algorithm, we also developed
an one-dimensional search algorithm based on bisection. In
addition, the SOP analysis of the proposed cooperative jam-
ming approach was derived for Rayleigh fading channels.
Simulation results were provided to validate the optimality
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and convergence of the proposed algorithm as well as the
theoretical derivation of SOP analysis. These results confirm
that the proposed algorithm yields the optimal power alloca-
tion at the jammers, whereas the numerical simulation results
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demonstrate the correctness of theoretical derivations of the
SOP analysis.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Function g(x) can be written as
g(x)=
KX
k=1
ak

wk(x)
ak


KY
k=1

wk(x)
ak
ak
= g^(x^) (A.1)
where the inequality in (A.1) is obtained from the arithmetic-
geometric mean inequality. This inequality holds with equality
when ak =
wk(x^)
g(x^) as follows:
g^(x^) =
KY
k=1

wk(x^)
ak
ak
=
KY
k=1
g(x^)
PK
k=1
wk(x^)
g(x^) = g(x^)
where
ak =
wk(x^)
g(x^)
and
KX
k=1
wk(x^)
g(x^)
= 1: (A.2)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (23)
Starting from (22) and using the definition of conditional
probability results in
Pout = 1 + Pr

D

+  < Emax < D

  Pr [Emax < D]
= 1 
Z 1
0
FEmax

y

+ 

fD(y)dy:
(B.1)
By using the change of variables x ! y= +  and the fact
that  < 0, yields (23).
APPENDIX C
CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION FOR (29)
To solve integral Y given by (29) that appears in the SOP
expression given by (28), we first make use of the multinomial
expansion [32, eq: (23)] for the M -factor product, yielding
MY
i=1
"
1  Ps exp

 
2
Ei
x
Ps
 NX
n=1
An
x+ n
#
= 1 +
X
figMi=1
P is exp
0@  x
Ps
iX
j=1
2Ej
1A NX
n=1
An
x+ n
!i
:
(C.1)
Then, in the latter expression, we utilize the multinomial
theorem to expand the ith power of the N -term sum as follows 
NX
n=1
An
x+ n
!i
=
X
k1+k2++kN=i
i!QN
n=1 kn!

NY
t=1
Aktt
(x+ t)kt
:
(C.2)
Substituting (C.2) into (C.1) and then into (29), integral Y can
be rewritten as
Y =
NX
n=1
An


2DI1;0 (; n; 0)
Ps

+ I2;0 (; n; 0)

+
X
figMi=1
P is
X
k1+k2++kN=i
i!
QN
t=1AkttQN
n=1 kn!

NX
n=1
An

h
2DI1;fkngNn=1
 
 i; n; fngNn=1

+
Ps

I2;fkngNn=1
 
 i; n; fngNn=1

(C.3)
9where  i ,  + P 1s
Pi
j=1 
2
Ej
. In addition,
I`;fkngNn=1

1; 2; f3;ngNn=1

for ` = 1; 2 as well as
for kn being positive integer and 1, 2, 3;n 2 R+
8 n = 1; 2; : : : ; N is defined as
I`;fkngNn=1

1; 2; f3;ngNn=1

=
Z 1
0
exp ( 1x)
(x+ 2)
`QN
n=1 (x+ 3;n)
kn
dx:
(C.4)
By using [23, Sec: 2.1] for the rational function integrand
in (C.5) in order to rewrite the integral as summations of
integrals, it can be shown that
I`;fkngNn=1

1; 2; f3;ngNn=1

=
X`
i=1
Zi
Z 1
0
exp ( 1x)
(x+ 2)
i
dx
+
NX
j=1
kjX
i=1

(kj)
i
Z 1
0
exp ( 1x)
(x+ 3;j)
i
dx
(C.5)
where the real-valued parameter Zi is given by
Z` k+1 =
1
(k   1)!
dk 1
dxk 1
(x)

x= 2
(C.6)
for k  ` with (x) =QNn=1 (x+ n) kn , and the real-valued
parameter (kj)i by

(kj)
kj k+1 =
1
(k   1)!
dk 1
dxk 1
j(x)

x= j
(C.7)
for k  kj with j(x) = (x+ 2) 1
QN
n 6=j (x+ n)
 kn . By
making use of [23, eq. (3.353/2)] for the integrals appearing
in (C.5), yields
I`;fkngNn=1

1; 2; f3;ngNn=1

=
X`
i=1
Zi
(i  1)!
i 1X
r=1
(r   1)!
 ( 1)i r 1  r2  
( 1)i 1
(i  1)! exp (12) Ei ( 12)
+
NX
j=1
kjX
i=1

(kj)
i
(i  1)!
i 1X
r=1
(r   1)! ( 1)i r 1  r3;j  
( 1)i 1
(i  1)!
 exp (13;j) Ei ( 13;j) :
(C.8)
Finally, by replacing (C.8) in (C.3) yields a closed-form
expression for integral Y .
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